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Mo' Claims Mo' Problems:




"The identity cannot be compartmentalized; it cannot be split
in halves or thirds, nor have any clearly defined set of
boundaries. I do not have several identities, I only have one,
made of all the elements that have shaped its unique
proportions."
-Amin Maalouf
Beginning with Kimberl6 Crenshaw's groundbreaking 1989
article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics,2 the legal world started to analyze how
antidiscrimination law marginalizes individuals who fall into more
than one protected category.' However, in the more than twenty
years since the publication of Crenshaw's article, employment
discrimination plaintiffs who bring claims based on more than one
protected category (e.g., race and sex discrimination) fare signifi-
cantly worse than plaintiffs bringing claims based on only one
protected category (e.g., race discrimination).' This idea-that
discrimination affects individuals who fall into multiple protected
categories in different ways than individuals in just one protected
t. J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to
thank Professor Stephen Befort and Professor Jessica Clarke for their advice and
feedback throughout the writing of this Article. I would also like to thank Stuart
Campbell, Rende Gordon, Glen Bassett, and my family and friends for their input
and support.
1. Amin Maalouf, Les Identitg Meurtria [Deadly Identities], 4 AL JADu, no. 25,
1998 (Brigitte Caland trans.), available at http://www.aljadid.com/content/deadly-
identities.
2. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
3. Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1482 (2009).
4. See infra Parts III-IV.
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category-is called the theory of intersectionality.' The concept of
intersectionality has become increasingly accepted in the academic
world, but courts applying employment antidiscrimination laws to
plaintiffs asserting claims based on multiple categories of
discrimination still require plaintiffs to compartmentalize,
separate, and split the various aspects of their identity.' This has
the effect of rendering their claims "virtually noncognizable in the
adjudication context."'
This Article aims to fill a hole in the field of intersectionality
research by introducing empirical data showing that courts do
indeed treat plaintiffs bringing multiple claims of discrimination
(multiple claimants) significantly worse than traditional, single-
claim plaintiffs (single claimants). Although there is a well-
developed body of theoretical work on intersectionality in
employment discrimination litigation, "there has been virtually no
empirical research that addresses the effects of intersectionality
on litigation outcomes.""
This Article presents an analysis of court opinions showing
that multiple claimants fare significantly worse than single
claimants in moving beyond the summary judgment stage. There
are multiple reasons as to why this may be occurring. This Article
argues that courts need to drastically rethink their approach to
multiple claimants in employment discrimination cases. Part I
discusses the history and development of employment discrim-
ination law in America. Part II addresses contemporary problems
in employment discrimination. Part III addresses prior empirical
research on litigation outcomes for multiple claimants. Part IV
presents an in-depth analysis of the empirical findings of this
study regarding litigation outcomes for multiple claimants.
Finally, Part V discusses some of the reasons multiple claimants
may be faring worse and introduces potential solutions.
5. See Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV.
69, 83-84 (2011) (describing the structures that allow intersectional discrimination
to persist).
6. See Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1461 (stating that while courts have recognized
that plaintiffs are allowed to bring claims based on multiple protected categories,
most courts still analyze each claim separately).
7. Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 738
(2011).
8. Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 991, 992 (2011).
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I. History and Development of American Employment
Discrimination Law
A. Title VII and Its Progeny
Title VII was passed in 1964 to protect American workers
from being discriminated against in the workplace on the basis of
protected categories: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.'
Title VII was primarily intended to address blatant forms of
excluding African Americans from the workplace.o A popularly
accepted view is that sex was added as a protected category under
Title VII in order to make it unacceptable to some of its supporters
or to defeat it by "laughing it to death."" However, many scholars
now claim that this story is apocryphal, and that sex was added as
a protected category for legitimate purposes. 2 The aim of the
statute was to, on a macro-level, discourage employment practices
that traditionally favored one group over another by providing
financial remedies to individual plaintiffs who could show that
they were victims of discriminatory employment practices based
on a protected characteristic.'3  Congress later passed similar
antidiscrimination statutes to protect other categories of
individuals in the workplace, including the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) of 196714 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990. "
9. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
10. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons
Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable
Worth, 19 DuQ. L. REV. 453, 453 (1980).
12. See id. at 454.
13. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would
have little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the
reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that "provide[s] the spur
or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far
as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in
this country's history."
Id. (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (1973)).
14. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (2006)).
15. Americans with Disabilites Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-203 (2006)).
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B. Frameworks for Analyzing Employment Discrimination
Claims
In interpreting employment discrimination claims, the
Supreme Court began to develop frameworks for analyzing
different types of claims. There are two types of employment
discrimination claims: disparate treatment and disparate
impact.1 6 Disparate impact claims involve a showing that an
.employer's facially neutral employment policy has a dispropor-
tionate, negative effect on a particular protected class of
employees." Although disparate impact claims do not require a
showing of intent, they do require evidence that the employment
policy in question creates a statistically significant disparity."
Disparate treatment claims, on the other hand, require a
showing that the employer took an adverse employment action
against an individual employee because of a protected factor, such
as race, and that the conduct was intentional." Disparate
treatment claims are further divided into those based on direct
evidence of discrimination and those based on circumstantial
evidence of discrimination. 2 0 Today, direct evidence claims are
rare and rely on "evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial
negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their
decision."2' This type of evidence usually comes in the form of a
comment made directly to the employee that links the adverse
employment decision to a protected category. An example of direct
evidence of discrimination would be an employer's comment to a
Hispanic applicant that the employer does not hire persons of
Hispanic descent. Courts have differed in their interpretation of
what constitutes direct evidence of discrimination in the employ-
ment context. Some courts adopt a definition of direct evidence as
meaning evidence which, if believed, proves the existence of
discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.2 2
16. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2010).
17. Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
18. Sperino, supra note 5, at 106.
19. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199.
20. Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659, 666 (7th
Cir. 2006).
21. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989).
22. See, e.g., Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999)
("Direct evidence is evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in
issue without inference or presumption." (internal quotations omitted)); Haas v.
ADVO Sys., Inc., 168 F.3d 732, 734 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that direct
evidence will show the employer "actually relied on" the characteristic when
making the employment decision). Other courts have defined "direct evidence" for
this purpose as evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of conduct or statements
342 [Vol. 30:339
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The most common type of claim in modern employment
discrimination litigation is the disparate treatment claim that
relies on circumstantial evidence.2 ' Due to its prevalence, this
type of claim will be the focus of this Article.
1. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
The Supreme Court has developed two types of frameworks
to analyze circumstantial evidence disparate treatment claims.
The McDonnell Douglas framework was developed by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 24 to apply to
circumstantial evidence disparate treatment claims, and is applied
to Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and § 1983 claims.2 5 Once a court
determines that there is no direct evidence of discrimination to
support a plaintiffs claim, the court applies a three-part, burden-
shifting framework.
Part one of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 27  This
that (1) reflect directly the alleged discriminatory animus and (2) bear squarely on
the contested employment decision. See, e.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d
219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Such a showing [of direct evidence] requires evidence of
conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude
and that bear directly on the contested employment decision." (quotations
omitted)). Still other courts hold that that as long as the evidence (whether direct
or circumstantial) is tied to the alleged discriminatory animus, it need not bear
squarely on the challenged employment decision. See, e.g., Lightfoot v. Union
Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A] plaintiff may carry his [or her]
burden of proving that a forbidden factor was a motive in his termination through
either direct or circumstantial evidence . . . .").
23. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1163 (1995).
24. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-54 (2003) (applying
the McDonnell Douglas framework to an ADA claim); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) (assuming that the McDonnell Douglas
framework applies to ADEA suits); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
506 n.1 (1993) (assuming that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims).
26. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
27. See Bearden v. Int'l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2008).
McDonnell Douglas itself was a failure-to-hire case, so the language of the
framework initially was that the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802 (1973). This language necessarily shifts due to the facts of each
case, and each circuit uses slightly different language. Id. at n.13. This Article
uses language from the Eighth Circuit because the cases analyzed herein are from
2012]1 343
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requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she (1) is a member of a
protected class; (2) is meeting his or her employer's legitimate job
expectations; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside
the protected class.28 At the prima facie stage of the McDonnell
Douglas test, establishing whether employees are similarly situ-
ated requires that the employees be "involved in or accused of the
same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways."29
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her action.30 If the
defendant articulates such a reason, "the burden returns to the
plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is pretextual.",3  At this
stage, the test for determining if other employees are similarly
situated to the plaintiff is rigorous.3 2 The plaintiff must show that
any individuals offered by them to show discrimination are
similarly situated in all relevant respects. Thus, to prove that an
individual is similarly situated, "the individuals used for compar-
ison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject
to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without
any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.",3  This burden-
shifting framework is applied in the vast majority of employment
discrimination litigation,3 and creates a heavier burden on the
plaintiff than the defendant.3 6
2. The Mixed-Motive Framework
Another framework for analyzing employment discrimination
cases is the so-called mixed-motive framework, first articulated by
the Eighth Circuit.
28. Fields v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Carpenter v. Conway Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 2007)).
29. Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Wheeler v. Aventis Pharms., 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2004)).
30. Bearden, 529 F.3d at 831-32.
31. Id. at 832.
32. Rodgers, 417 F.3d at 853.
33. Hervey v. Cnty. of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 720 (8th Cir. 2008).
34. Id. The Eighth Circuit adheres to a narrow interpretation of similarly
situated, while the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits apply a
less stringent standard. Howard Lavin & Elizabeth DiMichele, Split Circuits:
Supreme Court's Denial of Certiorari in Hervey Leaves Circuits Not 'Similarly
Situated,' 35 EMP. REL. L.J. 1, 1 (2009).
35. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 54 (7th ed. 2008) (noting that in 2006 alone, the framework was
cited in over three thousand cases).
36. Id. at 43.
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the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,17 a sex
discrimination claim. This framework applies when the employer
considers both legitimate and illegitimate factors when making an
employment decision." In Price Waterhouse, the Court found that
the plaintiffs aggressive personality was a legitimate reason for
her termination, but that it coexisted alongside illegitimate
reasons, namely sex discrimination and stereotyping due to the
decision makers' belief that the plaintiff was not "feminine"
enough."
In establishing the mixed-motive framework, Justice
Brennan, writing for a plurality of four justices, stated that once a
plaintiff proves that an illegitimate factor plays a "motivating
part" in the employment decision, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of this
impermissible motive.""' However, Justice O'Connor, writing in a
separate concurrence, held that the plaintiff must prove that an
illegitimate criterion played a "substantial factor" in the
employment decision, and that "the burden on the issue of
causation" would shift to the employer only where "a disparate
treatment plaintiff [could] show by direct evidence that an
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision."4 1
O'Connor's concurrence stated the narrowest grounds on which the
case could be decided, therefore becoming the holding of the case,
and this greatly restricted the situations in which plaintiffs could
use the mixed-motive framework.4 2
In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act "in large
part [as] a response to a series of decisions of [the Supreme] Court
interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964," particularly
its decision in Price Waterhouse . Interpreting the 1991 amend-
ments, the Supreme Court held in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa"
that direct evidence is not required for the plaintiff to show that
an illegitimate criterion motivated the employment decision, and
that once the plaintiff shows that an illegitimate criterion played a
motivating factor in the employment decision, the burden shifts to
37. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
38. Id. at 241.
39. Id. at 235 (quoting comments by a Price Waterhouse partner informing the
petitioner that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely").
40. Id. at 250 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 35, at 43.
43. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250 (1994).
44. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
they would have made the same decision absent the illegitimate
criteria." Lower courts have struggled with how to reconcile the
McDonnell Douglas framework with the mixed-motive framework,
and no particular approach has gained dominance.4 6
II. Contemporary Problems in Employment Discrimination
A. The Changing American Workplace
Since the laws addressing employment discrimination were
written, the American workplace has undergone a transformation
in both the demographic composition of workers and the
organizational structure of businesses.4 7 Studies have shown that
non-Whites and women began to make up a significantly larger
portion of the workforce following the passage of Title VII." There
is evidence to indicate, however, that while access to jobs for non-
Whites and women has increased substantially, most employment
discrimination litigation today focuses on discriminatory termi-
nation or failure to promote, rather than failure to hire.4 9
Since the passage of Title VII, the American workplace has
become substantially more diverse, specifically, becoming older,
more non-White, and more female." The number of workers ages
55 or older increased 52.4% between 1984 and 2004, and is
45. Id. at 100-02.
46. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 35, at 102-05 (describing the alternative
approaches to reconciling the McDonnell Douglas framework with the mixed-
motive framework).
47. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1110-11 (1991)
(presenting statistics showing the changing demography of the American workplace
since the passage of Title VII); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 487 (2005)
(arguing that workplace structure has dramatically changed over past several
years).
48. Donohue, supra note 47 (noting that since the passage of Title VII, the
number of non-Whites in managerial and professional positions had increased by
163.4%, and the number of women in managerial and professional positions had
increased by 157.8%).
49. Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 219, 236 (1994) (stating that by 1985, EEOC charges alleging wrongful
termination "outnumber[ed] hiring charges by more than six to one").
50. Stuart J. Ishimaru, Fulfilling the Promise of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 25, 26 (2005) (showing the percentage increases of non-
Whites and women in the American workforce); Mitra Toossi, Labor Force
Projections to 2014: Retiring Boomers, 128 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 25, 25 (2005)
(showing the trending and projected increases in older workers in the American
workforce).
346 [Vol. 30:339
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projected to continue to rise." Women now make up 49.9% of the
American workplace, and their participation rate is expected to
climb in the coming years.5 In terms of race, the percentage of
White participation in the workforce declined from 80.4% in 1984
to 70% in 2004, and is projected to be at 65.6% in 2014, with
Hispanics accounting for 15.9% of the anticipated 2014 workforce,
Blacks accounting for 12%, and Asians accounting for 5. 1%." As
the diversity of the workplace increases, so too does the number of
multiple claimants.
B. The Changing Nature of Discrimination
Research on the nature of discrimination in the workplace
suggests that discrimination is no longer blatant and overt, but
rather, is now subtle and hidden." In their research on
unconscious discrimination, social scientists theorize that the
natural human tendency to categorize people and objects can
result in a reliance on stereotypes. 6 Stereotypes cause
discrimination by unconsciously influencing what types of
information are recalled about a particular individual." Studies
have demonstrated that once a person holds a stereotypic
expectancy about a certain category of individuals, they are less
likely to remember behavior that does not conform to those
stereotypes, and will even falsely remember behavior as
conforming to stereotypes, even when it did not."
Research focusing on stereotypes of those who fall into more
than one minority category show that non-White women and men
face different stereotypes than White women and men, and that
these stereotypes are more likely to lead to negative
discrimination. Employers stereotype young Black men as lazy,
belligerent, or dangerous,6 0 but they stereotype Black women as
51. Toossi, supra note 50, at 38.
52. Women in the Workforce: Female Power, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2-8, 2010, at 49,
49.
53. Toossi, supra note 50, at 26.
54. See U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Why Do We Need E-Race?,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/why-e-race.cfm (last visited Feb. 29,
2012).
55. See Lee, supra note 47, at 482.
56. Krieger, supra note 23, at 1186.
57. See id. at 1199.
58. See id. at 1209.
59. Irene Browne & Joya Misra, The Intersection of Gender and Race in the
Labor Market, 29 ANN. REV. Soc. 487, 500 (2003). Research on intersectional
stereotypes has focused primarily on the intersection of race and gender. Id.
60. Id.; see also PHILIP MOSS & CHRIS TILLY, STORIES EMPLOYERS TELL: RACE,
3472012]
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distracted, single mothers desperate for a paycheck.6 1 These
studies do not suggest that one group suffers a worse form of
discrimination, but rather that persons with intersecting charac-
teristics face different stereotypes that lead to discrimination.6 2
Further, it is hard to separate these different parts of an
individual's identity and the ways in which these parts affect the
stereotypes others hold of that individual.
C. Intersectionality
1. Theory of Intersectionality
There is a rich body of scholarly articles on the topic of
intersectionality in the employment context," mostly from a
critical feminist perspective. 5  Intersectionality theorists argue
that race and sex discrimination claims are limited to the
experiences of the privileged members of each group.r" For
example, sex discrimination claims are viewed in terms of the
race-privileged members of the group (White women), while race
discrimination claims are viewed in terms of the sex-privileged
members of the group (non-White males)." These scholars have
called for a "more nuanced interpretation of Title VII that permits
the aggregation of claims,"6 8 and have advocated for the creation of
an "intersectional" claim for groups with multiple burdens.6 ' They
argue that claims based on a single axis of discrimination do not
accurately capture the experiences of those who are multiply
burdened because intersectionality is "the oppression that arises
out of the combination of various forms of discrimination, which
together produce something unique and distinct from any one form
of discrimination standing alone.""0 Most of these articles "focus
SKILL, AND HIRING IN AMERICA 102 (2001); Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M.
Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But...": The Meaning of Race for Employers,
in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 213 (1991).
61. Browne & Misra, supra note 59; Ivy Kennelly, That Single-Mother Element:
How White Employers Typify Black Workers, 13 GENDER & Soc'Y 168, 181 (1999).
62. Browne & Misra, supra note 59, at 500.
63. Id.
64. Best et al., supra note 8, at 991.
65. See Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1481.
66. D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?: Exponential
Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 NEB. L. REV. 552, 555 (2008).
67. Id.
68. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1481.
69. Lacy, supra note 66, at 554-55.
70. Julissa Reynoso, Perspectives on Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Gender,
and Other Grounds: Latinas at the Margins, 7 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 63, 64 (2004).
[Vol. 30:339348
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primarily on the race/gender paradigm and do not provide a
framework for the recognition of differently conjoined classes, such
as age and disability." In addition, these articles have not
focused on litigation outcomes for multiple claimants,7 2 or on the
problems of proof faced by these plaintiffs.
Kimberl6 Crenshaw introduced the concept of intersec-
tionality in a seminal 1989 article." In this article, Crenshaw
used the case DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division7 5
to illustrate her argument that the experiences of Black women
are oftentimes overlooked or marginalized by "the tendency to
treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of
experience and analysis."" She argued that this tendency "is
perpetuated by a single-axis framework that is dominant in
antidiscrimination law."7 7 Crenshaw concluded that while Black
women's experiences of discrimination sometimes correspond with
those of White women or Black men, they oftentimes experience a
unique form of bias that is directed specifically towards Black
women; this form of bias is largely ignored by the courts." After
the publication of her article, scholars began to expand Crenshaw's
theory of intersectionality to other groups, such as Asian women,
Latina women,o and Black men."
Because courts have, to one extent or another, taken the
collective suggestions of these authors in acknowledging and
allowing multiple claims, the focus of some scholars has shifted
from arguing that these claims should be recognized to discussing
how courts should analyze them.82 Minna J. Kotkin argues that,
although courts have allowed multiple claimants to bring their
claims, "few courts have engaged in any systematic or rigorous
analysis of the possibility of complex discrimination," and that "the
courts have given little in the way of evidentiary guidance on how
71. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1481.
72. Best et al., supra note 8, at 991.
73. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1481.
74. Lacy, supra note 66, at 558 (referencing Crenshaw, supra note 2).
75. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
76. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 139.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 149.
79. See Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using
Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of
Race, Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REv. 771 (1996).
80. See Reynoso, supra note 70.
81. See Lacy, supra note 66.
82. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1481.
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[multiple] claims might be proven."" This lack of analysis
contributes to multiple claimants' overall lower success rates than
single claimants.' Similarly, Kathryn Abrams argues that the
courts are reluctant to accept the claims of multiple claimants, and
that they have offered very little in the way of "help[ing to] explain
how [the claims] relate to the forms of race or gender
discrimination traditionally protected under the statute."" This
lack of analysis and explication, she argues, does not provide
stable or helpful precedent, and therefore negatively impacts the
recognition and success rates of similar future claims."
2. The History of Multiple Claims in Employment
Discrimination Litigation
At first, courts were reluctant to even recognize multiple
claims. Perhaps the most famous example of this phenomenon is
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division." The
plaintiffs, a group of Black women, alleged that General Motors
was discriminating against Black women in its seniority system."
The court refused to allow them to combine the categories of race
and sex into one protected category, stating that to do so would be
allowing them to "combine statutory remedies" and "create a new
'super-remedy' which would give them relief beyond what the
drafters of the relevant statutes intended."" The court chose
instead to analyze the two claims separately, and then dismissed
the sex-based claim, illustrating a problem that often occurs for
plaintiffs asserting multiple claims of discrimination: the court
found that because General Motors had a history of hiring White
women, there was no sex discrimination.90 Similarly, even if the
court had not dismissed the race claim, the employer could have
combated that claim by showing it had a history of hiring Black
men." Thus, under this approach, Black women are only legally
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 2479, 2493 (1994).
86. Id. at 2498.
87. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
88. Id. at 143.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 143-45.
91. Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle
in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C. R. L.J. 199, 200-01 (2006).
[Vol. 30:339350
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protected by Title VII to the extent that their experiences
correspond with those of White women or Black men.92
Some courts began to specifically recognize and address the
unique problems posed by multiple claimants. In Jeffries v.
Harrison County Community Action Ass'n,9" the court utilized the
newly developed sex-plus theory and applied it to a racial minority
for the first time.14  The plaintiff, a Black female, brought three
distinct claims: one based on race, one based on sex, and one
based on the combined category of race and sex." In reversing an
adverse grant of summary judgment, the court stated that
"discrimination against [B]lack females can exist even in the
absence of discrimination against [B]1ack men or [W]hite
women,"" and that:
when a Title VII plaintiff alleges that an employer
discriminates against [B]lack females, the fact that [B]lack
males and [Wlhite females are not subject to discrimination is
irrelevant and must not form any part of the basis for a
finding that the employer did not discriminate against the
[BIlack female plaintiff."
Similarly, in Lam v. University of Hawaii," the court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant.99  The defendants claimed that they did not
discriminate against the plaintiff, an Asian woman, and as proof
showed that they subsequently offered the disputed position to a
White woman and an Asian man.' The appellate court found
that the district court was incorrect in viewing the race and sex
claims as separate, because "where two bases for discrimination
exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct components," and
"attempt[ing] to bisect a person's identity at the intersection of
92. See Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 143.
93. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta, the Supreme Court first utilized what
has come to be known as a sex-plus theory to find that an employer could not have
a policy that discriminated against women with young children at home, but not
men with young children at home. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). The sex-plus theory
accepts as its premise that discrimination can occur when employees are
discriminated against based on a sex-neutral characteristic (such as marital status,
or whether the employee has children) that may disguise the underlying sex-based
discrimination. Id. Essentially, the Supreme Court recognized that Title VII
forbids employers from discriminating against a segment of a sexual group simply
because they are not discriminating against others in that group. Id.
95. Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1030.
96. Id. at 1032.
97. Id. at 1034.
98. 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).




race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular nature of
their experiences.""o'
However, even though most courts have at least implicitly
recognized multiple claims in some form or another, few have
explicitly stated that they are doing so. In the "typical" case,
judges will treat each claim as standing alone and analyze each
separately, without recognition or analysis of the unique struggles
that often face the multiple claimant.102
III. Prior Empirical Research on Litigation Outcomes for
Multiple Claimants
A. The Need for Quantitative Data Regarding Litigation
Outcomes for Multiple Claimants
Although there is a rich body of theoretical literature
addressing problems of intersectionality in employment discrim-
ination litigation, there has been very little empirical research on
litigation outcomes in this area.0 3  Part of the reason for this
paucity is a disagreement over methodology that has taken place
amongst critical race and feminism scholars."4 Most scholars
studying intersectionality focus entirely on qualitative and
interpretive methods, dismissing quantitative research as "overly
simplistic and positivist."'o However, other scholars argue for a
reconciliation of qualitative and quantitative methods, arguing
that the best method to use depends on the question asked.'06
"While racial, sex, or other categories certainly do not richly
describe people's experiences and identities, differing outcomes
across these categories are important indicators of structural
inequality and social stratification," and "quantitative research
may be best suited for documenting the aggregate patterns that
constitute between-group inequalities."o' Partially as a result of
this disagreement, almost no empirical research testing Kimberl6
Crenshaw's 1989 hypothesis-that multiple claimants fare worse
in court than do single claimants-has been done."
101. Id. at 1562.
102. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1461.
103. Best et al., supra note 8.




108. Id. at 999.
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B. Prior Existing Studies of Litigation Outcomes for
Multiple Claimants and Their Limitations
One study that analyzed litigation outcomes for multiple
claimants took a random 2% sample of over 50,000 employment
discrimination cases between 1965 and 1999."o' This resulted in
1,014 court opinions, of which 18% were multiple claims.1 o
Multiple claimants prevailed approximately 15% of the time, while
single claimants prevailed approximately 31% of the time, making
multiple claimants less than half as likely as single claimants to
prevail. "' While comprehensive, this study only analyzed multiple
claims brought on the bases of race and sex, and did not analyze
cases alleging age, disability, or other categories as bases of
discrimination." 2 Additionally, the study found that intersectional
claims increased dramatically over time, starting in the 1990s."'
The proportion of multiple claims may very well have continued to
rise after the study concluded in 1999." "This increasing
prevalence highlights the importance of learning how these claims
are faring.""'
The only other empirical study of the litigation outcomes of
multiple claimants was based on a sample of twenty-six multiple-
claim decisions selected from the Southern and Eastern Districts
of New York over a one-year period from June 2006 to June
2007.116 Based on this sample, the study found that summary
judgment was granted for the employer in twenty-two out of the
twenty-six cases."' In three of the remaining four cases, the
defendant won partial summary judgment, and the case moved
forward on at least one of the theories of discrimination."' In only
one case did the employee fully defeat the employer's summary
judgment motion."' This means that the employee fully survived
summary judgment only 3.8% of the time.12 0 If partial success is
included, this percentage rises to 15.3%.121 While revealing, this
109. Id.
110. Id. at 999, 1002.
111. Id. at 1009.
112. See id. at 1003.
113. Id. at 1008.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1009.








study was admittedly limited in scope,122 and did not use a control
group of single claim cases from the same courts during the same
time to measure the differences in outcome between the two
groups.12' Thus, the study in this Article, described in more detail
in the next section, is aimed at addressing some of the limitations
of previous studies, as well as contributing to the growing body of
research in employment litigation outcomes for multiple
claimants.
IV. An Empirical Study of Employment Discrimination
Claims in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals from
2008-2010
A. Methodology
The data used in this study is based on 162 employment
discrimination cases from the Eighth Circuit, from 2008 to 2010.124
This sample includes all employment discrimination cases that
were appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals during that
time frame.'12 This allows analysis of both how district courts deal
with multiple discrimination claims, as well as how they are dealt
with at the appellate level.12 6 All the cases were entered into a
spreadsheet. The spreadsheet recorded for each case what
statute(s) the claim was brought under,12 what basis(es) of
discrimination the plaintiff was claiming,12 whether the case was
published at the appellate level, whether the plaintiff was pro se,
and a brief description of the outcome of the case (i.e., plaintiff lost
at summary judgment at district court, affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit).12' The district court's grant of summary judgment was
recorded as either whole or partial, and the appellate decision was
122. Id.
123. See Best, et al., supra note 8, at 1007; Kotkin, supra note 3, at 2458.
124. Emma Denny, 8th Circuit Employment Discrimination Case Outcome
Chart (Feb. 21, 2012) (unpublished study) (on file with author).
125. Id. All known cases were included, based on searching Westlaw for the
terms "employment & discrimination," selecting the Eighth Circuit as the database,
and limiting results to 2008-10. See id. Harassment and hostile work
environment cases were excluded from the data. See id.
126. See id.
127. The claims were bought under Title VII, ADA, Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
ADEA, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Government Employees Rights Act, and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
128. Bases of discrimination alleged by employees included in the spreadsheet
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recorded as either affirming, or wholly or partially reversing that
decision. 130
B. Results
Of the 162 total cases in the sample, 53 (32.7%) were based
on multiple claims. 13 1 Of these 53 claims, only 4 (7.5%) made it
past summary judgment, either in whole or in part.1 32 This means
that 92.5% of the plaintiffs in this sample bringing multiple claims
of discrimination never made it to trial on any of their claims. '3
This is in comparison to the 33 of 109 (30.3%) employment
discrimination cases based on single claims of discrimination in
the Eighth Circuit during the same time period that made it past
summary judgment.' This means that 69.7% of single-claim
employment discrimination plaintiffs from this sample did not
make it past summary judgment, as opposed to 92.5% of multiple-
claim employment discrimination plaintiffs. 3" This is roughly in
line with other research in the field.'
Several patterns emerge from the data. First, it is apparent
that multiple claimants make it past the summary judgment stage
less often than single claimants (7.5% of multiple claim plaintiffs,
as opposed to 30.3% of single claim plaintiffs).1 7 When counting
the percentage of multiple claimants whose entire claims survive
summary judgment, as opposed to partial success (i.e., surviving
summary judgment on a race discrimination claim, but losing on
the sex discrimination claim) the number drops to only 1 out of 53
(1.9%).138
Second, not only do multiple claimants prevail at the
summary judgment stage less often at district court (1.9% of
multiple claimants, as opposed to 19.3% of single claimants), but
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. For the purposes of this Article, "making it past summary judgment"
will mean plaintiffs who either made it to trial, had a favorable summary judgment
decision (in whole or in part), or had an unfavorable summary judgment decision




136. See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1459. In Kotkin's sample of employment
discrimination cases from the Second Circuit over a one-year period, she found that
96% of multiple claims did not make it past summary judgment, as opposed to a
rate of 73% of plaintiffs losing at the summary judgment stage (in cases where
summary judgment motions were made) overall. Id.




they also are less likely to have unfavorable pre-trial decisions
reversed at the appellate court level (5.8% of multiple claimants,
as opposed to 23.8% of single claimants). 13 ' This indicates that
judges do not believe, as a matter of law, that multiple claimants
have a sufficient basis to create a genuine issue of material fact to
make it to trial, and that this belief exists at both the trial court
and appellate court levels at a higher rate than it exists for single
claimants. 'o
Third, multiple claimants appear pro se at a higher rate than
do single claimants (37.7% of multiple claimants, as opposed to
12.8% of single claimants).141 However, even when controlling for
the increased likelihood of an adverse outcome that accompanies
being a pro se plaintiff, by removing the pro se plaintiffs from the
data pool, multiple claimants still fare worse than single claimants
(12.1% of represented multiple claimants make it past summary
judgment, as opposed to 34.7% of represented single claimants).4 1
In both categories, 100% of pro se plaintiffs failed to make it past
summary judgment."'
Fourth, appellate courts publish the decisions of multiple-
claim cases at a lower rate than single-claim cases (28.3% of
multiple-claim cases, as opposed to 66.1% of single-claim cases).'"
This indicates that courts find single-claim employment discrim-
ination cases more worthy of discussion, and therefore single-claim
cases continue to influence precedent at a higher rate than
multiple-claim cases, further stifling the development of the law in
this area.'4'
C. Analysis
A closer analysis of the four multiple-claim cases that made it
past summary judgment is useful because it illustrates the
hurdles that multiple claimants face. At the district court level,
only one multiple-claim plaintiff defeated the employer's summary
judgment motion on any of the claims. That case, Wimbley v.
Cashion,146 was also the only case where the plaintiff entirely








146. 588 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2009).
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claims. 14 7 The district court judgment in favor of the employee's
race and sex discrimination claims was also affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals."
In the second case, Nedeltchev v. Sheraton St. Louis City
Center Hotel & Suites,"' a race and national origin discrimination
case, the employee lost on both claims in district court.5 o The
appellate court reversed the adverse grant of summary judgment
on the race discrimination claim, but affirmed the adverse grant of
summary judgment on the national origin claim."'1
In the third case, Maxfield v. Cintas Corp., No. 2,152 a race
and military service discrimination case, the employee lost at the
district court on both claims at summary judgment, but the
adverse grant of summary judgment on the military service claim
was reversed and remanded by the appellate court."3 On remand,
the district court again granted summary judgment for the
employer on the military service discrimination claim, and was
again reversed by the appellate court.1 54 The district court then
granted a jury trial, and the plaintiff ultimately lost at jury trial
on the military service claim.
In the fourth case, Ziegler v. Kempthorne,"' the plaintiff
brought a claim for age and military service discrimination. 117 The
district court granted summary judgment for the employer on both
claims, and the appellate court reversed and remanded on the age
discrimination claim, but affirmed the adverse grant of summary
judgment on the military service claim.'
Of the four cases in the data set that survived summary
judgment, only one survived on all claims."8 The other three
survived summary judgment on one of their claims, but only on
partial reversal of the adverse grant of summary judgment by the
appellate court.'' This data set only includes decisions that were
147. See Denny, supra note 124.
148. Wimbley, 588 F.3d at 963.
149. 335 Fed. Appx. 656 (8th Cir. 2009).
150. Id. at 657.
151. Id.
152. 563 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 2009).
153. Id. at 692-93.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 693-94.
156. 266 Fed. Appx. 505 (8th Cir. 2008).
157. Id. at 506.
158. Id. at 507.
159. See cases cited supra notes 146-58.
160. See cases cited supra notes 149-58.
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appealed."' If all decisions, including those which were not
appealed, were included, it is likely that the number of adverse
summary judgment decisions for multiple claimants would be
closer to the 1.9% of multiple claim plaintiffs who survive
summary judgment at the district court level, rather than the
7.5% that survive summary judgment when accounting for
appellate reversals.1 62 These extremely low numbers indicate the
challenges faced by multiple claimants in employment discrim-
ination litigation.
V. Policy Implications of the Data
This data yields an obvious question: why are multiple
claimants faring significantly worse than single claimants by
every measure of the data? Several theories may provide an
answer to this question.
A. Multiple Claimants' Suits Tend to Have Less Merit
One common argument for why multiple claimants fare
worse than single claimants in employment discrimination
litigation is because their claims are inherently weaker.'63
Proponents of this theory suggest that the reason for the multiple
claims of discrimination is because the plaintiffs are simply adding
on additional claims, hoping one of them is successful.'64 One
federal judge expressed this viewpoint, stating that plaintiffs who
assert multiple claims of discrimination are "throwing a plate of
spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks."'5 Consequently, these
judges are more skeptical of multiple claimants than they are of
the more traditional single-claim employment discrimination
plaintiff.
161. See Denny, supra note 124.
162. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 107-
08 (2009). The authors of this study of employment litigation outcomes in federal
court found that only twenty percent of unfavorable decisions at the district court
level for employment discrimination plaintiffs were appealed to the circuit court,
and of these, only half received a final appellate judgment. Id. Because victory
rates for multiple claimants were lower at the district court than at the appellate
court, it is likely that the overall numbers for multiple claimant victory are closer
to the district court numbers, assuming similar appeals rates to the Clermont and
Schwab study.
163. Best et al., supra note 8, at 1011.
164. Id.
165. Michael Bologna, Judges Warn Employment Lawyers Against Motions for
Dismissal, Summary Judgment, 19 Emp. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) 595, Dec. 4,
2002 (quoting criticism of plaintiffs' lawyers by United States District Court Judge
Ruben Castillo of the Northern District of Illinois).
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In a prior study on the effect of multiple claims of
discrimination on litigation outcomes, the authors attempted to
control and test for this explanation."' After controlling for
several factors in the data to attempt to measure the correlation
between claim intersectionality and the merits of the case, the
authors concluded that "intersectional claims are not the result of
plaintiffs frivolously adding additional claims.""'7 It is, of course,
very difficult to test for the inherent strength or weakness of
particular claims in an objective, empirically based way, because
that would require looking beyond the judicial opinions to the
briefs, depositions, testimony, and other trial documents.'" Such
an inquiry is therefore beyond the scope of this study.
One potential factor from the data set in this article is the
fact that multiple claimants appear pro se at a higher rate (37.7%)
than single claimants (12.8%).169 Pro se plaintiffs tend to fare
worse than represented plaintiffs in employment discrimination
litigation.1o This is partially because they do not have a
professional advocate assisting them in making sophisticated legal
arguments, and partially because it is likely they have been
turned down by numerous attorneys who believed their cases to
have poor chances for victory in the first place, suggesting that
their cases are inherently weak.' Because pro se plaintiffs
represent a higher proportion of multiple claimants, one could
conclude that multiple claimants have inherently weaker claims
overall. However, even when removing the pro se litigants from
the data pool, represented multiple claimants still make it past
summary judgment (12.1%) at a much lower rate than represented
single-claim plaintiffs (34.7%). 172
Based on the fact that represented multiple claimants fare
worse than represented single claimants, as well as prior research
on the topic, it seems unlikely that multiple claimants have suits
that lack merit at a rate that far exceeds that of single claimants.
The argument that multiple claimants have inherently weaker
cases, therefore, is unlikely to account for the wide statistical
disparity in success rates of multiple and single claimants.
166. Best et al., supra note 8, at 1011.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 25-26 n.27.
169. See Denny, supra note 124.
170. Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 56 (2005).
171. Id.
172. See Denny, supra note 124.
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B. Courts Refuse to Explicitly Analyze Multiple Claims
While the majority of courts have, at least implicitly,
recognized multiple claims, the majority have done so without an
explicit recognition of the ways in which multiple claims differ
from single claims of discrimination.1 7 3  Courts tend to view each
claim independently, each requiring separate bodies of proof,
which in turn leads to lower rates of success in the courtroom for
multiple claimants.1 74 This lack of explicit acknowledgment of
multiple claims, and lack of analysis, has led to stifling the
development of the law for multiple claimants." This lack of
development has led to upholding the status quo in employment
discrimination law for multiple claimants, both in the workplace
and the courtroom.1 7 6
This phenomenon can be seen most clearly in the data that
show the Eighth Circuit publishes their opinions on single-claim
employment discrimination cases at a significantly higher rate
(66.1%) than for multiple-claim employment discrimination cases
(28.3%). 17 In none of the multiple-claim cases in the data set did a
court explicitly address the fact that a particular case involved
multiple claims of discrimination, or discuss how cases involving
multiple claims of discrimination may require a different analysis
than single-claim cases."17  This observation of the data, both from
a quantitative and qualitative perspective, lines up with the
anecdotal observations of other scholars in the field, who have
decried that "as multiple claims have proliferated, few courts have
engaged in any systematic or rigorous analysis of the possibility of
173. See Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1461.
174. See id. at 1481. As discussed above, requiring multiple claimants to prove
each claim separately oftentimes results in a Catch-22 situation whereby the
employer can defeat the race claim by showing that employees of the same race but
opposite sex were promoted, and can defeat the sex claim by showing employees of
the same sex but different race were promoted.
175. Abrams, supra note 85, at 2539-40.
176. See id. at 2540.
177. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated
on rehearing, 235 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit declared
unconstitutional its rule that states, "unpublished opinions are not precedent and
parties generally should not cite them." Id. However, the ruling was later vacated
after the parties settled, leaving "[t]he constitutionality of that portion of Rule
28A(i) ... an open question in this Circuit." Id. at 1056. Scholars have criticized
judges as engaging in strategic behavior by simply not publishing opinions for
difficult cases rather than engaging in a difficult analysis of the issues. See Mitu
Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157,
192-93 (1998).
178. See Denny, supra note 124.
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complex discrimination.""' This lack of analysis has stifled the
development of the law for multiple claimants, despite an increase
in multiple claims as an overall percentage of employment
*180discrimination cases.
The obvious solution is, of course, for courts to explicitly
address the challenges facing multiple claimants in their opinions,
and to publish cases involving multiple claims at the same rate as
cases involving only single claims. However, it is also up to the
attorneys representing multiple claimants to be aware of the
uphill battle facing their clients, and to alert judges to the
disparity between multiple and single claimants in their briefs and
summary judgment responses, perhaps using research and
literature in the field."' As has been noted earlier, there is a lack
of quantitative research on the litigation outcomes of multiple
claimants,'8 2 and judges may not be aware of the statistical
disparity. It is not until judges and practitioners become aware of
this discrepancy, and the lack of precedent offering concrete
guidance for the multiple claimant, that precedent specifically
addressing the problem will begin to develop.
C. Courts Are Reluctant to Allow Plaintiffs to Avail
Themselves of the Mixed-Motive Framework at the
Summary Judgment Stage of Litigation
After the Supreme Court decided Desert Palace,'2 the lower
courts struggled with how to integrate the mixed-motive theory
with the McDonnell Douglas framework.' The Eighth Circuit, in
Griffith v. City of Des Moines,"'" held that Desert Palace does not
apply to McDonnell Douglas cases at the summary judgment stage
because Desert Palace was decided in regard to jury instructions. 186
Therefore, a plaintiff cannot avail herself of the benefits of the
mixed-motive framework in the Eighth Circuit unless her case
makes it past summary judgment. She must prove to a judge
179. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1481.
180. See Best et al., supra note 8, at 1009.
181. See Lee, supra note 47, at 499 (arguing that attorneys should offer, and
courts should consider, statistical evidence demonstrating the role that unconscious
bias plays in the workplace).
182. Best et al., supra note 8, at 991.
183. 539 U.S. 90, 100-02 (2003) (holding that if plaintiffs could prove that an
illegitimate factor played a motivating part in the employment decision, the burden
would shift to the employer).
184. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 35, at 102.
185. 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).




that a reasonable jury could find she was discriminated against
under the single-factor McDonnell Douglas framework before she
can progress to trial."' As we have seen, only one multiple
claimant, out of fifty-three, was able to convince a judge that she
was discriminated against under the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work, thereby defeating the employer's summary judgment
motion. "9 Because a large percentage of multiple claimants lose at
summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
Eighth Circuit is essentially denying these plaintiffs the
opportunity to avail themselves of a potentially beneficial mixed-
motive theory of discrimination.
Traditional McDonnell Douglas cases "could be framed as
'single motive' cases-the employer had either acted from
discriminatory motives or it had acted because of its asserted
'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.""" However, cases that
assert multiple claims of discrimination are, by their very nature,
mixed-motive cases, in that the plaintiff is asserting that the
employer had multiple illegitimate reasons for the employment
decision (race, sex, disability, etc.). Therefore, in trying to force
plaintiffs into the single-motive McDonnell Douglas framework,
courts are attempting to force plaintiffs to split their identity-
telling them they must pick one motive for the employment
decision, and prove that the employer acted because of it.
While the Title VII framework has been developed to deal
with individuals who fall into only one protected category,
"perceptions are based on the entire constellation of social
attributes of the individual within the interaction-race, gender,
physical ability/disability, age-rather than a single dimension."'
Courts require claimants to prove that employers intentionally
discriminated against them, and to be able to articulate on what
grounds that discrimination took place. Social science, however,
indicates that this is close to impossible because the employer is
likely unaware that it is discriminating."2 Further complicating
the picture, multiple claimants might not be able to tease apart
the different strands of their identity that may be affecting the
stereotypes others hold of them, which makes fitting their case
188. Id.
189. Denny, supra note 124.
190. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 35, at 43.
191. Browne & Misra, supra note 59, at 499.
192. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 969, 979 (2006) ("[A]n 'honest' concern about an employee may very often be
both 'honest' and (unbeknownst to the decision maker) entirely a product of the
employee's status as an African-American worker.").
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into the single-motive McDonnell Douglas framework more
difficult than for the single-claim plaintiff.193
A good example of this effect can be seen in one of the cases
from the data set in this article. In Montes v. Greater Twin Cities
Youth Symphonies,'94 the Black, Haitian-American plaintiff
brought a race and national origin discrimination suit against his
employer after his termination, citing several examples of
statements made to him during the course of employment that he
perceived as being discriminatory.' One such comment involved
board members telling the plaintiff that he "needed to be
integrated into the community as an African-American.""' The
board attempted to form a committee that would help him
"assimilate" and a subcommittee to address his soft-spokenness
and accent."9 The plaintiff testified that he perceived this attempt
to form a committee to help him assimilate to be discriminatory,
and a board member testified that she found this suggestion by the
board to be inappropriate.'" However, using the McDonnell
Douglas framework, the court stated that the plaintiff had failed
to provide evidence that his race or national origin was the
determinative factor behind the employment decision, stating:
Board members' suggestions of forming an African-American
committee to help Montes assimilate into the Minneapolis
community and a subcommittee to address Montes's soft
spokenness and accent also did not evince discrimination. At
most, this evidence suggested board members were aware of
Montes's ethnicity and the issues that could arise within the
Minneapolis community and Youth Symphonies, an all-
Caucasian organization, as a result. No reasonable jury could
conclude this evidence indicated the board terminated
Montes's employment because of his race or national origin.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff was unable
to defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment on either
claim.
The court did not make explicit how it was analyzing
Montes's race and national origin claims, but it is easy to see how
hard it was to separate the employer's proffered reason for the
193. See Wendy Hulko, The Time- and Context-Contingent Nature of
Intersectionality and Interlocking Oppressions, 24 AFFILIA: J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK
44, 49(2009).
194. 540 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2008).




199. Id. at 859.
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termination (the plaintiffs continued refusal to cooperate with the
board of directors) from the potential illegitimate reasons (some
combination of the plaintiffs race and national origin). If the
employer had offered to send the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse to "a
course at charm school" in order to help her become more
feminine, would that have been discrimination? If she had refused
to attend, would that be further evidence of her difficult
personality? Because the plaintiff perceived the proposed African-
American committee to be discriminatory, he declined to
participate, something which the board may have perceived as him
being "difficult."200 Was the committee formed because of his race
or national origin? Was his resistance to participating in it him
being legitimately difficult, or rather, a reasonable response to
perceived discrimination? If it was reasonable, then was the
employer's perception of him as "difficult" partially based on
illegitimate discrimination? These are all questions the court may
have better been able to address under a mixed-motive theory.
By forcing the plaintiff into the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the court precluded him from a potential mixed-motive
theory.2 0 ' Under a mixed-motive theory, the plaintiff may have
been able to show that while the employer's proffered reasons for
his termination-his allegedly difficult personality and refusal to
cooperate-played a role in the decision, his race and/or national
origin also played a motivating part of the decision. Under this
framework, the plaintiff has a lower bar to meet than under
McDonnell Douglas.2 0 2 If the plaintiff had succeeded in showing
that race and/or national origin had played a motivating part of
the decision, along with his alleged personality defects, the burden
would have then shifted to the employer to show that they would
have made the same decision even absent the illegitimate
criteria.203 Whether the plaintiff would have been able to proffer
such evidence is an open question, but at least he likely would
have been able to meet his initial burden under the mixed-motive
theory at the summary judgment stage.
It seems likely that multiple claimants-whose claims, by
their very nature, are "mixed-motive"-would stand to benefit the
most from judges analyzing their claims through a mixed-motive
framework at the summary judgment stage. Because judges still
200. Id. at 856.
201. Id.
202. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 35, at 43.
203. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
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insist on analyzing each claim separately,204 plaintiffs must prove
something at the summary judgment stage (that one basis for
discrimination was the determinative factor in the employer's
decision) that they would not have to prove at trial under a mixed-
motive framework.
The Ninth Circuit provides one potential approach for
integration of McDonnell Douglas and Desert Palace. This
approach, outlined in Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation
Department,205 allows the plaintiff to advance a mixed-motive
theory at the summary judgment stage when she would not be
able to meet her burden under McDonnell Douglas.2 06 In reversing
the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment, the
appeals court stated that "[ain employer may be held liable under
Title VII even if it had a legitimate reason for its employment
decision, as long as an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor
in the decision."207 This approach "would essentially allow
McDonnell Douglas[-]along with all the other theories that can
be applied, with all pointing toward the ultimate question of
liability for discrimination [-]to be determined by . .. [the]
'motivating factor' test."'08
More research is needed to determine if allowing the mixed-
motive framework to be advanced at the summary judgment stage
would help narrow the discrepancy between multiple and single
claimants. However, due to the inherently "mixed" nature of
multiple claims, and the difficulties involved with distinguishing
the multiple potential illegitimate factors from the potential
legitimate factors, it seems probable that the Ninth Circuit's
approach would go a long way towards narrowing this gap.
D. The Requirement of Similarly Situated Comparators
Disproportionately Disadvantages Multiple Claimants
The most common stumbling block for multiple claimants is
the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework, when they must show that the employer's proffered
reason for the adverse employment action was mere pretext for
204. See Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1461 (stating that while courts have recognized
plaintiffs are allowed to bring claims based on multiple protected categories, most
courts still analyze each claim separately).
205. 424 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005).
206. Id. at 1037-42.
207. Id. at 1040.
208. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 35, at 104.
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discrimination.20 9 The plaintiffs burden of proving that the reason
was a pretext for discrimination is very difficult to meet, and even
more difficult for multiple claimants.2 10 This is because the most
common method of proving pretext is to show that similarly
situated employees who do not belong to the plaintiffs protected
class received more favorable treatment.1 1  Most courts require
that a comparator be someone who shares none of the protected
characteristics of the plaintiff, so that a Black, female plaintiff
would have to use a non-Black, male comparator to prove
212pretext.22 One court remarking on the difficulties facing multiple
claimants with regards to finding a comparator stated that "the
more specific the composite class in which the plaintiff claims
membership, the more onerous th[e] ultimate burden" of proving
*213discrimination.
Courts have argued that the comparator requirement is
necessary to prove intent, and that a finding of discrimination
cannot be made without a showing that the plaintiff "received
differential treatment vis-A-vis members of a different group on
the basis of a statutorily described characteristic." 21 4 The problem
with the view that an employee cannot prove discrimination
unless he or she can point to similarly situated individuals who
were treated more favorably is that it constricts the very idea of
215discrimination. As common sense and case law reveal,
discrimination can occur in the absence of a similarly situated
comparator.216 However, courts will typically only find that
discrimination occurred if there is a similarly situated comparator
who was treated better, meaning that if an employee was
discriminated against, but no suitable comparator can be found, he
or she is often without a remedy in court.21 7 Scholars argue that
due to the problems of finding a similarly situated comparator, the
comparator requirement has left multiple claims "virtually
noncognizable in the adjudication context." 2 18
209. See, e.g., Bearden v. Int'l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 828, 831-32 (8th Cir. 2008).
210. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1491.
211. Id.
212. See Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 2009).
213. Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327 (D. Md. 2003).
214. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 611 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting id. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
215. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 732.
216. Id. at 733 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236 (1989), in
which the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was discriminatorily denied
partnership, despite the absence of comparators).
217. See id. at 735.
218. Id. at 738.
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This effect can be seen at play in one of the cases from the
data set, Wimbley v. Cashion.219 Unsurprisingly, this is the only
case in the data set in which the plaintiff wholly defeated the
employer's motion for summary judgment at both the district and
appellate court levels. In this case, the plaintiff, a Black, female
prison guard, was involved in an incident where she discharged
her pepper spray on an inmate in violation of prison policy. 22 0 The
plaintiff claimed it was accidental, and during litigation, several
inmates corroborated her version of the story. 221 A White, male
prison guard was present as well, and also discharged his pepper
spray on an inmate, arguably in violation of prison policy, in what
he claimed was an attempt to subdue the prisoner. 22 2 Inmates
later contradicted the male guard's claim that the inmate he used
the pepper spray on was resisting. 22 The warden immediately
terminated the plaintiff, without launching an internal invest-
igation of her actions, as was required by prison policy. 2 24 The
warden took no disciplinary action against the White, male
guard.2  The court found that this discrepancy in the way the
warden treated the two guards created a genuine issue of material
fact for the jury, and upheld both the race and sex claims. 2 6
This case illustrates the rare circumstances that must be
present in order for a multiple claimant to prevail on his or her
claim for summary judgment. The "individuals used for
comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been
subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct
without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances."22 7
Further, the comparator must fall into none of the same protected
categories as the plaintiff. 228 What if, instead of being involved in
this incident with a White, male prison guard, the plaintiff was
involved in this incident with a White, female prison guard who
was not subsequently terminated? What if there had also been a
Black, male prison guard present, and neither he nor the White
219. 588 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2009).
220. Id. at 961.
221. Id. at 963.
222. Id. at 961.
223. Id. at 963.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 961.
226. Id. at 963.
227. Hervey v. Cnty. of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 720 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing
Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000)).
228. Wirnbley, 588 F.3d at 962 ("[Defendant] argues that Wimbley cannot




female prison guard were subsequently terminated? Arguably, the
court would have ruled that no discrimination occurred, because
the race and sex claims could each be separately defeated.229
What if the White, male guard had a different supervisor
than the plaintiff, and the two different supervisors made the
exact same decisions that were made in this case, one firing the
plaintiff, the other one not firing the White, male guard? Arguably
again, the court would have ruled that there was no discrimination
as the one possible comparator would have to be excluded because
he would not meet the "same supervisor" requirement.23 0 What if
there simply was no other guard present during the incident, but
the employer still fired the plaintiff, even though he would not
have done so had she been a White male? There, the plaintiff
would have a very difficult time proving her case because she
would have no evidence to present to prove her claim that she was
fired because of her race or sex. She could perhaps point to other
similar incidents where White, male guards were not disciplined
as harshly as she, but the court could easily distinguish those
incidents from the one in which she was involved.
Despite being a victory for the plaintiff, this case shows the
difficulties inherent in bringing multiple claims of discrimination.
The plaintiff simply got lucky in terms of the viability of her case.
She was involved in the exact same incident, at the exact same
time, with a coworker who shared the exact same job responsi-
bilities as her, had the exact same supervisor, happened to share
none of the protected characteristics, and was treated in exactly
the opposite way that she was after the incident. If any of these
factors were to change, it is likely the plaintiff would not have
survived summary judgment, despite the fact that those factors
arguably had little, if anything, to do with whether or not
discrimination occurred. The plaintiff in this case is an anomaly,
as can be demonstrated by the fact that she was the only multiple
claimant, out of fifty-three, to wholly defeat the employer's
summary judgment motion.
Scholars have argued for a few different options to replace or
modify the comparator requirement. One option is simply to
expand the available pool of comparators by allowing individuals
to serve as comparators despite differences in job descriptions or
supervisors. 231 However, this solution generally requires expert
229. See Areheart, supra note 91.
230. See Hervey, 527 F.3d at 720.
231. Kotkin, supra note 3, at 1497-98.
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testimony to determine who is similarly situated. 232  Another
solution is to allow for hypothetical as well as actual comparators.
This is an approach taken by the European Union, which, through
its discrimination-related directives, has provided that discrim-
ination can be found "where one person is treated less favourably
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable
situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin."233 However, the
problem with hypothetical comparators is they are "exceedingly
difficult to conceptualize in a way that would capture discrim-
inatory conduct but not workplace behavior that is offensive but
permissible."2 3
Because the comparator requirement is simply a proxy for
intent, the use of comparators should still be available as one
factor in determining whether the plaintiff was discriminated
against, but as one factor among many, including "comments and
acts by other employees, firm demographics, and firm policies,
among other aspects of workplace life and governance."23' Again,
statistical data and expert testimony regarding the role of
unconscious bias in workplace decisions could be introduced as
part of a plaintiffs showing of pretext, instead of relying solely on
finding proper comparators.2 If some combination of these
suggestions were implemented, it could potentially help eliminate
the discrepancy between multiple and single claimants in
employment discrimination litigation.
Conclusion
The data presented in this and other studies show what
intersectionality scholars have attempted to describe-that
multiple claimants fare worse in employment discrimination
litigation than do single claimants. The problems are systemic,
and are perpetuated and amplified by most courts' failure to
analyze the difficulties posed by multiple claims, by courts
continuing to "split" plaintiffs' identities by analyzing their claims
separately, by courts not consistently allowing plaintiffs to avail
232. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 808 ("The difficulty with experts ... comes in
drawing the link from the insights of the implicit bias and structurally focused
literatures to the dynamics of a specific workplace and the adverse treatment of a
particular employee.").
233. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC).
234. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 807.
235. Id. at 731 n.3 (arguing that the use of comparators is simply a means by
which judges attempt to view the unviewable dimension of employer intent).
236. Id. at 809.
237. See Lee, supra note 47, at 498-99.
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themselves of the mixed-motive framework at the summary
judgment stage of litigation, and by the difficulties of finding a
proper comparator. While concrete solutions may seem difficult,
one thing is clear: the system as it currently exists is unworkable
for multiple claimants and a more rigorous analysis by courts is
needed to address the unique problems facing multiple claimants.
